For a better analysis of the computational costs, we first give the comparative results between our protocol and some valuable protocols [13, 14] regarding the size of the message in Table 1. Then, based on the size of the message, we analyze their calculation costs and give the results in Figure 3. Without a loss of overall quality, an opposing C is still considered a PPT algorithm in the security model. In addition, C is assumed to have the ability to control the entire communication network. This means that messages can be reproduced, listened to, modified, suspended and injected arbitrarily by the adversary. The ability of an opponent C is always described by a series of queries. Here we give only simple information about the eCK model and more details in the literature of Huang and Cao . (i) EphemeraKeyReveal (). Otherwise, it is an answering machine. (vii) Test (). This request occurs normally during the experiment. Adversary C can only send this request once to a new completed session.
The session selects a random value if a test query is retrieved by adversary C. If , this session returns the session key to C. Otherwise, a random number that should not be distinguished from the session key is given to the opponent C. Proof. Based on ID-eCK security, we know that both features are the basic requirements that a secure AKA protocol should meet. We can know that the second condition of the accuracy of our protocol is met. Next, we show that the first condition can also be fulfilled in the following content. In the eCK security model, the security setting of our protocol is indicated.
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